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1. INTRODUCTION 
Lobbying is inherently a result of Mancur Olson’s collective action 
problem.  “Small, homogeneous groups with strong communities 
of interest tend to be more effective suppliers of political pressure 
and political support (votes, campaign contributions, and the like) 
than larger groups whose interests are more diffuse.”1  As a result, 
lobbying reform is not undertaken until the public as a whole 
creates a coalition large enough to overcome the coercion created 
by a much smaller group of lobbyists.  As noted by Congress, lob-
bying on behalf of foreign entities can have serious implications for 
national policy beyond the effects created by domestic lobbyists 
whose ultimate goal arguably still pertains to the betterment of 
American society.2   
 
* Editor-in-Chief of University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, vol. 
31.  I would like to thank my fellow board members and the Journal for all of its 
hard work this year.  It absolutely is an experience I will take with me for the rest 
of my life.  I would also like to thank my parents, Bassam and Virginia Atieh, for 
their love and support throughout my legal education.  For without their help and 
advice, none of this would have been possible.   
1 William F. Shughart II, Public Choice, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ECONOMICS (David R. Henderson ed., 2002), available at http://www.econlib.org 
/library/Enc/PublicChoice.html.  
2 See Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. § 611 (2006), which states: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy and purpose of this Act to protect 
the national defense, internal security, and foreign relations of the United 
States by requiring public disclosure by persons engaging in propaganda 
activities and other activities for or on behalf of foreign governments, 
foreign political parties, and other foreign principals so that the Gov-
ernment and the people of the United States may be informed of the 
identity of such persons and may appraise their statements and actions 
in the light of their associations and activities. 
Id.; see also Robert Pear, A Gray Law Illuminates Billy Carter’s Foreign Deals, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 20, 1980, at E3 (noting that Congress created greater restrictions on 
foreign lobbyists than on their domestic counterparts). 
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In response to this perceived threat, Congress has tended to 
keep the regulation of lobbyists representing foreign principals 
more stringent than that of their domestic counterparts.  The 
Foreign Agent Registration Act (“FARA”)3 is Congress’s premier 
tool of regulation for foreign lobbyists.  As I will explain below, the 
regulation of foreign lobbyists under FARA has historically been 
much more stringent than regulations for domestic lobbyists under 
the former Federal Regulation of Lobbyist Act of 1946 (“FRLA”) 
and the current Lobbyist Disclosure Act of 1995 (“LDA”), by 
requiring more thorough disclosures and enacting harsher 
penalties for failing to register. 
As lobbying has grown in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, its abuses have followed suit.  Abuses by lobbyists often 
result in a “political scandal” that creates a public outcry to reform 
lobbying law.  Lobbyists are often the targets of such scandals 
because, by way of their constant interaction with legislators, they 
often possess a keen ability to rightly or wrongly influence 
politicians.  Congress responds by reforming lobbyist regulations 
when the public believes that lobbyists have had an undue 
influence on legislation or policy.4  Since Congress is 
democratically elected, the public is the ultimate judge of the 
propriety of the lobbyists’ proposed policy.  However, while 
Congress has responded to the recent outcry against domestic 
lobbyists by enacting domestic lobbyist reform—as evidenced by 
its enactment of the LDA and its subsequent 2007 revision—it has 
done little to alleviate many of the loopholes that exist in FARA.  
Moreover, it is these loopholes that have led to many of the recent 
foreign lobbying scandals in Congress.  Many of these scandals 
could have been prevented had Congress responded and updated 
FARA along with the LDA.  Instead, these loopholes in FARA have 
allowed foreign lobbyists to unduly influence U.S. foreign and 
domestic policy. 
 
3 Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–21 (2006). 
4 See infra Section 4.2. (describing how political scandals that arose from 
perceived lobbying scandals are often the product of the general public’s rejection 
of the lobbyist proposed position); see also Kevin Bogardus, White House Demands 
More Information from K Street on Lobbying Registrations, THE HILL, Jan. 29, 2010, 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administrator/78671-white-house-wants-more-
information-from-k-street (last visited Apr. 6, 2010) (stating that President 
Obama’s proposals for lobbyist reform stated in the President’s 2010 State of the 
Union Address were based on the perceived influence that lobbyists have on 
legislation). 
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This Comment will argue that in order to prevent further 
subrogation of the policy, it is necessary to update FARA by 
changing several of its provisions to allow the public more advance 
notice of lobbyist intent, before any actual lobbying activity has 
taken place.  Such an update would alleviate many of the collective 
action problems from the lobbyists’ rent-seeking behavior.  This 
Comment will first define the collective action problem of lobbying 
and explain generally how small entities can gain immense power.  
Second, it will analyze FARA and the current lobbying law of the 
United States.  Third, it will highlight the current loopholes of 
FARA, analyze their history, and explain how these loopholes 
allow lobbyists to avoid registration.  Fourth, this Comment will 
analyze examples of registration failures under FARA, and the 
consequences for U.S. policy.  Finally, this Comment will provide 
several proposals for updating FARA and discuss the feasibility 
and effectiveness of each. 
2. THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM OF LOBBYING 
Public choice theory looks to analyze the context in which 
decisions are made by our government.5  The theory begins with 
the premise that all actors—including voters, lobbyists, and 
legislators—will always act in their own rational self-interest.6  
Mancur Olson, who developed the theory of collective action, 
postulated that because such actors are acting in their own self-
interest, it follows that when acting as a group, the same actors 
“will not voluntarily act to achieve their common or group 
interest” unless the group goal is exactly the same as their own 
self-interested goal.7  The only way to tame this problem is to have 
a group that is sufficiently small such that the group’s interests are 
in line with the individual’s self-interest.  In the realm of lobbying, 
this theory holds great weight.  While the government is charged 
with benefiting the public as a whole, the individual member of 
Congress has his or her own self-interest in seeking funding and 
support for reelection.  Therefore, the special interest lobby 
 
5 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: 
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 3–4 (Univ. of Mich. Press 
2007) (1965) (describing the capabilities and limitations of collective choice 
theory). 
6 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 1 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (1965). 
7 Id. at 2.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
ATIEH.DOC 11/17/2010  2:57 PM 
1054 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:4 
behaves rationally by seeking their own beneficial legislation, and 
the member of Congress is likewise behaving rationally by 
accepting such funding.  The problem lies in the result.  The cost to 
special interest groups who benefit is very small because the cost of 
the policy is ultimately born out on all of the taxpayers.  However, 
the entirety of the gain is likewise theirs because the policy 
advocated only specifically favors them.8  Similarly, since the cost 
is spread among the public at large, the cost to the individual 
taxpayer is actually quite small.  Therefore, the expected gain of 
canceling the policy from the taxpayer’s perspective is likewise 
small.9  Since the cost of trying to affect policy can be quite high for 
the individual taxpayer relative to the expected gain, due to the 
costs of lobbying or campaigning against such policies, a rational 
taxpayer would likewise not have any incentive to try to stop such 
behavior.  Olson’s problem then re-occurs because in order for the 
total expected gains of the collective to outweigh the costs, the 
group of taxpayers must be significantly large.10 
Unfortunately, the public faces significant hurdles in 
aggregating a group large enough.  First, because all people are 
rational actors, many may see that the opportunity to free-ride 
exists.  Individuals may choose not to spend their money and 
support the cause because they know that even a positive outcome 
will ultimately be shared with the taxpayers as a whole.11  If 
enough people adopt this mentality, the group will not be able to 
sustain itself and, thus, not exist at all.  Second, and more 
importantly, such a group suffers from an informational problem.  
The public as a whole lacks specific information regarding when 
policies that may affect them are adopted.12  Without such 
information, the public will not be stirred into action at all because 
they are not even aware that they are being harmed. 
 
8 This behavior is often called rent-seeking.  It refers to the practice of one 
entity trying to push the costs of the project on the whole while solely retaining 
the benefit.  See Anne Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 
AM. ECON. REV. 291, 291 (1974) (defining different types of rent seeking behavior). 
9 See id. (explaining the costs of rent-seeking behavior).  
10 See OLSON, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing the aggregation of costs). 
11 See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 473 (2003) (discussing the free-
rider problem in the context of collective action). 
12 See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 57–63 (1994) (discussing 
rational choice theory and the informational gap of the voting public). 
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Therefore, the evil of lobbying lies in the result.  Congress has 
an electoral and, arguably a constitutional, duty to protect the 
entirety of their constituency.  However, in order to remain in 
power, members of Congress require significant campaign 
contributions, often provided by lobbyists.13  Lobbyists in return 
have the ear of the member of Congress and are able to make 
proposals more readily.  Unfortunately, their constituencies:  1) 
often do not have any information on proposals being pushed by 
lobbyists, and 2) cannot individually or collectively mobilize to 
fight against the proposal because the expected gain of their 
individual mobilization is small and the cost of collectivizing is 
prohibitively large.14 
3. LOBBYING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: FARA AND THE LDA 
All lobbying laws in the United States work in a similar 
manner.  These laws seek to fix the abovementioned informational 
disadvantage that prevents the public from collectively acting.  
Their goal is not to restrict the speech of the lobbyist or the content 
of their lobbying; rather, their goal is to inform the public about 
who is influencing their representatives, and how such influence is 
obtained.15  It is believed that through adequate registration of 
activities, the public will be informed of such excess influence and 
be able to respond by using its own methods of action—
condemnation and voting.16 
 
13 The effect of this money is now even more profound given the recent 
Supreme Court decision in Citizen’s United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 08-205, slip 
op. at 50 (U.S. Jan 21, 2010) (striking down campaign finance limits formerly 
imposed on political action committees and corporations).  
14 See id. at 34 (recognizing that there is no affirmative federal interest in 
equalizing “the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome 
of elections.”). 
15 See Lobbyist Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1601(3) (2006) (“[T]he 
effective public disclosure of the identity and extent of the efforts of paid lobbyists 
to influence Federal officials in the conduct of Government actions will increase 
public confidence in the integrity of Government.”). 
16 A recent example of this is the successful backlash against the sale of U.S. 
ports to a Dubai owned company.  Public watchdog groups were able, through 
the LDA, to find the existence of lobbying and bring it to the public’s attention, 
ultimately ending the deal.  See Elana Schor & Roxana Tiron, Foreign-Agent 
Lobbyists Amid Uproars, Duck for Cover, THE HILL, Mar. 29, 2006, 
http://www.citizensforethics.org/node/22688 (last visited Apr. 6, 2010) 
(discussing how the Dubai Ports deal ultimately failed).   
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Similarly, it should be noted that lobbying laws are typically 
updated during a period of blatant scandals.17  For example, the 
Republican Revolution of 1994, which saw the first change of 
power in the House of Representatives in over forty years, was 
based in part on public disgust over the perceived excess influence 
of lobbyists.18  The public backlash returned in 2006, when the 
American public, after growing weary of the continued lobbying 
scandals that plagued a then Republican Congress, voted in a new 
Democratic majority that vowed to fundamentally change lobbying 
laws.  After each of these scandals, domestic lobbying laws were 
updated almost immediately thereafter.19  Furthermore, as shown 
below the regulation of lobbyists representing foreign entities is 
often revised when the public is similarly aroused. 
During these periods of reform, the proposed reforms seek to 
give the public more information on who is lobbying the 
government so that the public would theoretically be able to 
prevent scandal by voicing disdain against policies they do not like 
before they are adopted.  This is also meant to solve the 
information drought that plagues the public’s attempts at collective 
action.  Each of FARA’s subsequent reforms occurred during one 
of these periods of condemnation.  
3.1. History of FARA 
FARA’s original inception in 1938 was designed to halt the 
spread of Nazi propaganda immediately preceding U.S. entry into 
World War II.20  However, the law was not designed to 
substantively censor or restrict foreign propaganda; rather, it was 
 
17 During such scandals, the collective action problem is solved because the 
information is often readily available to the public due to media attention.  
Similarly, the media helps to align the public response to such scandals via 
elections.  See GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 59–60 (noting that variables such 
as civic duty, closeness of election, and media attention on issues can often 
overcome the voter collective action problem).  
18 See Helen Dewar & Michael Weisskopf, House Gives Final Approval to 
Lobbyist Disclosure Bill, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1995, at A1 (describing how House 
Republicans fulfilled their electoral promise of lobbying reform). 
19 See id. at A14 (reporting that the LDA was a response to the perceived 
excesses of lobbyists prior to the Republican Revolution of 1994). 
20 See Robert G. Waters, Note, The Foreign Agents Registration Act: How Open 
Should the Market Place of Ideas Be?, 53 MO. L. REV. 795, 798–99 (1988) (describing 
the creation of FARA by the House Un-American Activities Committee with the 
purpose of halting the “spread of propaganda and ideologies alien to our form of 
government”). 
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designed to deter its use and adoption through mandatory 
disclosure requirements and fear of criminal punishment.  The law 
thereby required “total public transparency over the operations of 
foreign agents in the US.”21  While the use of FARA as an anti-
propaganda tool continued after World War II to include 
communist propaganda;22 FARA was subsequently amended in 
1942 to “shield the U.S. Congress and the President from foreign-
influenced grassroots lobbying shaping policy, legislation and 
lawmaking,”23 predominantly due to the accession of the United 
States as a superpower.24  Therefore, the 1942 amendments make 
clear that the purpose of FARA is to “protect the national defense, 
internal security, and foreign relations of the United States by 
requiring public disclosure . . . [of] activities for or on behalf of 
foreign governments . . . .”25  In order to step up enforcement, 
FARA was subsequently put under the jurisdiction of the Justice 
Department.26 
However, in the 1960s, a slate of blatant enforcement failures 
led to significant public outcry against the excesses of lobbying 
 
21 GRANT F. SMITH, AMERICA’S DEFENSE LINE: THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S 
BATTLE TO REGISTER THE ISRAELI LOBBY AS AGENTS OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT 51 
(Institute for Research 2008). 
22 Mark B. Baker, Updating the Foreign Agents Registration Act to Meet the 
Current Economic Threat to National Security, 25 TEX. INT’L L.J. 23, 25 (1990) (“After 
World War II, FARA served little use other than to track Communist propaganda 
through the warmer phases of the Cold War.”). 
23 SMITH, supra note 21. 
24 See Baker, supra note 22, at 2 (noting that most attempts to influence U.S. 
policy stem from desire to promote economic interests rather than subversive 
interests). 
25 22 U.S.C. § 611 (2006). 
26 The statute states: 
Upon the effective date of this Act [see Effective Date of 1942 Amend-
ment note above], all powers, duties, and functions of the Secretary of 
State under the Act of June 8, 1938, 52 Stat. 631, as amended shall be 
transferred to and become vested in the Attorney General, together with 
all property, books, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations 
used by or available to the Secretary of State for carrying out the func-
tions devolving on him under the above-cited Act. 
Id.  This allowed for both the monitoring and enforcement functions to be under 
the same room, effectively streamlining the process.  See also SMITH, supra note 21, 
at 54 (noting that increased prison terms for violations accompanied the transfer). 
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which prompted Congress to question FARA’s efficacy.27  One of 
the most serious problems with FARA was the lack of spirited 
enforcement by the Justice Department,28 who feared the 
potentially explosive nature of foreign lobbying investigations.29  
Therefore, in 1963 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee led by 
Chairman J.W. Fulbright held hearings to investigate FARA’s 
shortcomings30 and recommend revisions for the Act.31  The 
committee proposed a slew of new amendments to FARA to close 
several of the loopholes that allowed non-registry.32  The panel also 
proposed increased penalties for non-compliance, as well as an 
increase in the operating budget for enforcement.33  However, 
while these amendments did much to increase the class of people 
 
27 For example, in 1961, a public relations firm who wrote speeches for 
members of Congress on behalf of West Germany “[i]n order to influence public 
opinion” also “directly petitioned President Kennedy . . . urg[ing] him . . . to 
declare publicly that the U.S. appreciated the loyalty of [the West German 
Chancellor] to the Western cause” to help prevent the possibility of the Chancellor 
losing his upcoming election.  RUSSELL WARREN HOWE & SARAH HAYS TROTT, THE 
POWER PEDDLERS: A REVEALING ACCOUNT OF FOREIGN LOBBYING IN WASHINGTON 22 
(1977). 
28 Between 1951 and 1960, the United Jewish Appeal resisted FARA 
registration due to lax enforcement, and was able to allocate over $2 million per 
year to politicians who supported their pro-Israeli policies.  See SMITH, supra note 
21, at 119 (discussing the continued lack of FARA enforcement against pro-Israeli 
lobbies that preceded the 1966 Amendments). 
29 One of the few prosecutions in 1958 against an FBI agent illegally acting as 
a foreign agent for the Dominican Republic was eventually overturned on appeal 
due to lack of proof.  Frank v. United States, 262 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1958).  This 
“case would surface again as a warning to all observers of just how politically 
explosive FARA enforcement could be,” due to fact that many lobbyists are 
former Congressmen, or in this case agents of the U.S. government.  SMITH, supra 
note 21, at 60. 
30 GRANT F. SMITH, FOREIGN AGENTS: THE AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
COMMITTEE FROM THE 1963 FULBRIGHT HEARINGS TO THE 2005 ESPIONAGE SCANDAL 
21–29 (2007) (describing and providing transcripts to the Fulbright Hearings). 
31 Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United 
States Before S. Comm. On Foreign Relations, 88th Cong. (1963) [hereinafter Fulbright 
Hearings] (describing the ultimate goals of the hearings); see also HOWE & TROTT, 
supra note 27, at 17–20 (describing the committee’s investigation into the failings 
of FARA). 
32 See S. REP. No. 89–143, at 4 (1965) (describing the redefinition of “agent” to 
include “the lawyer-lobbyist and public relations counsel whose object [was] not 
to subvert or overthrow the U.S. Government, but to influence its policies [for a] 
particular client”). 
33 See Harry Kennedy, Jr., What You Should Know…About the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act, 11 PUB. REL. Q. 17, 18–19 (1966) (discussing the 1966 amendments 
to FARA and the implications it could have on lobbyists). 
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who must register, they also simultaneously created many 
loopholes, including exemptions for attorneys, domestic 
subsidiaries of foreign corporations, and activities “not serving [a] 
predominately . . . foreign interest.”34  Since FARA has not 
undergone a major overhaul since these amendments, all of the 
major loopholes that exist from this version are essentially still in 
effect today.35 
Given these shortcomings, it did not appear as if it would take 
long until the public would again demand amendment of FARA.  
This outcry seemed to have occurred in the late 1970s after a 
scathing report by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) 
sparked outrage in Congress over the Department of Justice’s 
(“DOJ”) administration of agent registration.36  Congress once 
again, through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, studied 
several of these failures,37 recommended changes to the Act, and 
called for increased DOJ enforcement.38  Unfortunately, despite the 
apparent importance of lobbying reform,39 Congress failed to pass 
any substantive reform.  Since this failure to reform, GAO has 
subsequently released several reports, most recently in 2008, citing 
 
34  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS 
REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938, AS AMENDED, AND ITS ADMINISTRATION BY THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  6 (1974) [hereinafter GAO 1974]. 
35 See Michael I. Spak, America for Sale: When Well-Connected Former Federal 
Officials Peddle Their Influence to the Highest Foreign Bidder, 78 KY. L.J. 237, 248–49 
(1990) (noting that FARA’s last substantive revision came in 1966).  
36 GAO 1974, supra note 34. 
37 Several of the new failures included the lobbying by Greek-Americans to 
enact an arms embargo against Turkey without first registering, and the influence 
of lobbyist in speeches delivered abroad by Congressmen abroad in the early 
1970s.  See, e.g., HOWE & TROTT, supra note 27, at 21–22 (discussing the influence of 
lobbyists in a speech delivered by Senator Strom Thurmond in South Africa).  
These examples again demonstrate how U.S. policy can be altered by the efforts of 
lobbyists without public knowledge. 
38 S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., THE FOREIGN AGENTS 
REGISTRATION ACT 30 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter CRS 1977] (discussing the 
DOJ’s role in enforcing FARA). 
39 HOWE & TROTT, supra note 27, at 26 (citing the belief of New York 
Congressman, Lester Wolff, that warranted the creation of a specialized federal 
commission to guarantee the strong enforcement of FARA provisions). 
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the very same reasons and premises for FARA reform.40  Similarly 
Congress has studied the issue multiple times and has determined 
that action needed to be taken, but has likewise failed to act.41 
The last public outcry that triggered any reform was the early 
1990s backlash against the perceived influence of Japanese 
companies on U.S. trade policy.42  While there were significant calls 
to reform FARA itself,43 domestic lobbying laws were reformed 
instead with the introduction of the LDA.  Even though the LDA 
represents a significant step forward in terms of domestic lobbying 
registration,44 it also represents two steps back for foreign lobbyist 
registration.  It allows foreign business agents to register under the 
LDA instead of FARA, despite the potential effect on U.S. policy.45, 
46  As I will note below, since the LDA requires less disclosure than 
 
40 See GAO 1974, supra note 34, at 31 (noting the failure of the 1966 
amendments to FARA); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, FOREIGN AGENT REGISTRATION: JUSTICE NEEDS TO IMPROVE PROGRAM 
ADMINISTRATION 4 (1980) [hereinafter GAO 1980] (describing the urgent need to 
make reforms to FARA); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, Foreign Agent Registration and Former High-Level Officials Representing 
Foreign Interests: Before the S. Comm. On Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st 
Cong. 4 (1990) [hereinafter GAO 1990] (reaffirming the 1980 recommendations 
and proposing further recommendations to improve the registration of foreign 
agents); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, POST-
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS AND FOREIGN AGENT REGISTRATION: 
ADDITIONAL ACTION NEEDED TO ENHANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF REQUIREMENTS 2–4 
(2008) [hereinafter GAO 2008] (stating that GAO has asked for substantive 
changes in the enforcement  of FARA since 1974).  Each report represents efforts 
by the GAO to increase enforcement of FARA by the DOJ. 
41 See CRS 1977, supra note 38, at 112 (recommending several changes to 
FARA to increase enforcement). 
42 See PAT CHOATE, AGENTS OF INFLUENCE 203 (1990) (discussing how Japanese 
lobbyists were able to affect U.S. policy through large donations to fund 
presidential libraries). 
43 See Philip J. Perry, Recently Proposed Reforms to the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act, 23 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 133, 145–46 (1990) (discussing Senator John 
Heinz’s proposed reforms of FARA in the wake of Toshiba’s failure to timely 
register their $3 million lobbying effort to affect trade policy). 
44 See Charles Lawson, Shining the ‘Spotlight of Pitiless Publicity’ on Foreign 
Lobbyists? Evaluating the Impact of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 on the Foreign 
Agents Registration Act, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1151, 1174 (1996) (describing the 
LDA as a “legislative victory” that recognized and fixed the shortcomings of the 
former domestic lobbying disclosure statutes). 
45 See 22 U.S.C. § 613(h) (2006) (exempting agents registered under the LDA). 
46 The LDA did make one good substantive change to FARA.  Prior to 1995, 
attorneys were exempt from FARA registration no matter the type of 
representation they offered.  The LDA closed this loophole by only exempting 
attorneys who were actively representing the foreign principal in court.  See id. 
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FARA, this fact, combined with the material impact foreign 
lobbyists may have on U.S. policy, illuminates the need to close 
this loophole. 
Despite the increased regulation of domestic lobbying by the 
LDA, Congress has not substantively changed FARA since its 1966 
revisions.47  While Congress typically amends both domestic and 
foreign lobbyist registration during the same reform periods,48 they 
have not reformed FARA after the introduction of the LDA in 1995 
and its amendment in 2007 after the Abramoff scandal.  Likewise, 
several recent scandals discussed below make it clear that FARA is 
in need of significant updating.  If the above pattern holds, it 
would be safe to assume that real reform of FARA will occur in the 
near future as scandals usually precede reform.  
3.2. Structure and Applicability of FARA 
FARA is designed to work in a manner similar to that of other 
lobby disclosure laws.49  Its main structure allows the regulation of 
lobbying not through the regulation of substance, but through 
public disclosure of activities.50  It is believed that through this 
public disclosure, a well-informed public will be in the best 
position to decide whether the policy that the agents are 
attempting to influence their representative into adopting is 
appropriate.51  This would negate the second prong of the 
collective action problems facing the public by putting them on 
 
47 See Lawson, supra note 44, at 1162 (describing the 1966 amendment of 
FARA as the most significant revisions since the bills inception). 
48 For example, shortly after the FARA amendments of 1942, Congress 
enacted the FRLA in 1946 to register domestic lobbyists.  Similarly, in 1966 
domestic lobbying laws were strengthened to match the bolstering of FARA.  See 
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. § 261 (repealed 1993).  
49 See Lawson, supra note 44, at 1179–81 (discussing the LDA’s impact on the 
structure of FARA). 
50 See id. at 1156–57 (stating that FARA was designed not to limit the 
information disseminated, but to allow for public disclosure of its source).  
51 See id. (noting that FARA enabled “U.S. citizens [to] make an informed 
decision[] as to the accuracy of the information”).  However, agents who claim an 
exception under FARA do not need to notify the DOJ that they are not filing due 
to an exception.  See GAO 2008, supra note 40, at 2 (stating that it is the duty of the 
DOJ to find all FARA violators).  
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notice.  However, in order for this system to work effectively, 
proper disclosure is imperative.52 
FARA is essentially self-policed, such that it requires the 
lobbyists themselves to take the initiative to learn which types of 
activities necessitate disclosures and when disclosures must be 
filed.53  Furthermore, the DOJ is intended to act as a gatekeeper in 
this process, investigating, and prosecuting potential violators.54  
FARA’s operative section requires that “[n]o person shall act as an 
agent of a foreign principal unless he has filed with the Attorney 
General a true and complete registration statement . . . or unless he 
is exempt from registration . . . .”55  Therefore, one must know 
when they are an “agent,” who qualifies as a “foreign principal,” 
and what is required in a filing. 
The term “agent” refers to any person or organization, who 
acts in any “capacity at the order, request, or under direction or 
control, of a foreign principal . . . .”56  Under the 1966 revisions, this 
includes any person who engages in political activities, acts as 
public relations counsel, solicits money for the principal, dispenses 
contributions, and represents the principal before any agency or 
official of the government.57  Therefore, this definition, as 
interpreted by the DOJ, is meant to include all types of lobbying 
activities that try to influence policy.58 
FARA’s distinguishing factor is that the lobbying activity must 
be made on behalf of a foreign principal.59  Foreign principal 
encompasses any foreign government or political party, any person 
residing outside the United States, or any organization organized 
 
52 The act itself requires the ability for public examination of records.  22 
U.S.C. § 616(a).  Similarly, since 2004 the DOJ has put the database online allowing 
for public searches.  United States Department of Justice, Foreign Agent 
Registration Search, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fara/links/search.html 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2008). 
53 Perry, supra note 43, at 142. 
54 Id. at 143. 
55 22 U.S.C. § 612(a) (2006). 
56 Id. § 611(a), (c). 
57 Id. § 611(c). 
58 See GAO 2008, supra note 40, at 7 (discussing the definition of an agent of a 
foreign principle under FARA). 
59 22 U.S.C. § 612(a).  Otherwise, the lobbyist would likewise have to file 
under the LDA.  See 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (1995) (noting the need for public disclosure of 
lobbying activities). 
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under the laws of a foreign country.60  While this term seems very 
broad, as we will see below, several exceptions and loopholes have 
undercut its apparent breadth. 
Once an agent has determined that they are required to register 
under FARA, they are subject to very stringent reporting 
requirements.  In addition to requiring a statement of how much 
money is spent on behalf of the principal for lobbying activities, 
FARA also requires that all expenditures be itemized, separating 
lobbying costs from campaign contributions to politicians.61  
Moreover, FARA also requires that a copy of any written 
agreement be filed with the DOJ as well.62  This filing must also 
include a description of how the agreement was reached as well as 
a detailed summary of the obligations of both parties.63  These 
requirements were enacted to provide an accurate account of what 
influence or type of influence the agent is seeking, and how the 
agent went about obtaining that influence, by requiring 
documentation of every step that necessitated any agreement.64  
While the breadth of these requirements can serve as a powerful 
tool for the public, once again for the Act to work properly, not 
only is mere disclosure necessary, but accurate disclosure is also 
 
60 22 U.S.C. § 612(b) (2006); see also GAO 2008, supra note 40, at 7–8 
(discussing the interpretation of foreign principal). 
61 See 22 U.S.C. § 612(a)(5) (2006) (discussing how the registration statement 
must include “[t]he nature and amount of contributions, income, money, or thing 
of value, if any, that the registrant has received . . . and the form and time of each 
such payment and from whom received”). 
62 Id. § 612(a)(4), which states: 
Copies of each written agreement and the terms and conditions of each 
oral agreement, including all modifications of such agreements, or, 
where no contract exists, a full statement of all the circumstances, by rea-
son of which the registrant is an agent of a foreign principal; a compre-
hensive statement of the nature and method of performance of each such 
contract, and of the existing and proposed activity or activities engaged 
in or to be engaged in by the registrant as agent of a foreign principal for 
each such foreign principal, including a detailed statement of any such 
activity which is a political activity. 
Id. 
63 Id. § 612(a)(4)–(9) (mandating detailed explanations accompanying each 
filing). 
64 See GAO 1980, supra note 40, at 3 (discussing the purposes of GAO’s 
disclosure requirements in the context of the Justice Departments failure to 
uphold the spirit of the act through enforcement).  
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required, so that the public is aware of exactly how the 
government is being influenced.65 
In a similar vein, the penalties of FARA non-compliance are 
stringent.66  Under the Act, violations of FARA, which are criminal, 
include total failure to file a registration statement, filing an untrue 
or fraudulent statement, and filing a deficient registration 
statement.67  Penalties range from removal of aliens or injunctive 
relief, to five years imprisonment and a $5,000–$10,000 fine.68  
However, FARA does not allow for the imposition of civil 
penalties,69 nor does it allow for a private right of action.70 
FARA contains exceptions to filing only in limited 
circumstances.  For example, employees of foreign states 
(including diplomats, officials, and their staff) are exempt from 
filing.71  Similarly, religious personnel, attorneys (only to the extent 
they are engaged in active legal representation before a court of 
law), and private humanitarian activities are also exempt.72  In 
addition, agents who are allowed to register under the LDA are 
also exempt from FARA.73 
3.3. The LDA and its Comparison to FARA 
The Lobbyist Disclosure Act of 1995 was a major overhaul of 
domestic lobbying disclosure.  The LDA’s functionality is similar to 
that of FARA where its primary purpose is to ensure adequate 
disclosure of lobbying activity because “the voice of the people 
may all too easily be drowned out by the voice of special interest 
groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as 
 
65 See SMITH, supra note 21, at 202–03 (stating that inaccurate FARA 
disclosures and lack of prosecution against them can “create a serious drag on 
society and has a corrosive effect on public law abidance”). 
66 See Lawson, supra note 44, at 1157–58 (noting the criminal penalties for 
failure to comply with FARA). 
67 22 U.S.C. § 618(a) (2006). 
68 Id.  
69 See Lawson, supra note 44, at 1173–74 (arguing that giving the DOJ power 
to impose civil liability would improve the enforceability of FARA). 
70 See Comm. for a Free Namibia v. Sw. Africa People’s Org., 554 F. Supp. 
722, 723 (D.D.C. 1982) (holding that the plaintiff who sought to compel FARA 
registration against a group lobbying to alter U.S. policy for Namibia lacked 
standing for a private cause of action under FARA). 
71 22 U.S.C. § 613(a)–(c) (2006). 
72 See id. § 613(d)–(g) (listing the exemptions under FARA). 
73 Id. § 613(h). 
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proponents of the public weal.”74  Substantively, however, FARA 
differs significantly from the LDA.  First, the LDA explicitly 
defines lobbyists, lobbying activities, and lobbying contacts in an 
attempt to clarify those who fall under the Act.75  Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, adequate disclosure under the LDA is 
much less stringent than under FARA.76  Under the LDA, a 
lobbyist only has to file a semi-annual report that contains his 
name, firm, a short description of the “general issue area” on 
behalf of which they are lobbying, and a “good faith estimate of the 
total amount of” income received and expenses on behalf of the 
client.77  FARA, on the other hand, requires regular updates of 
activities to the DOJ, detailed lists of activities, an itemized account 
of expenditures, and copies of all oral or written agreements.78  
Third, violations of the LDA for failure to file or for fraudulent 
filings are only punishable by civil penalties of up to $50,000 as 
opposed to FARA’s criminal penalties.79  Finally, these differences 
are only heightened by the fact that the LDA exempts certain 
foreign lobbyists, mainly commercial entities, from filing FARA 
reports.80  This was done despite the fact that the commercial 
interests represented are still mainly those of a foreign entity.81 
 
74 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954). 
75 FARA instead relies on an overly broad definition of the agency to include 
any contact on behalf of an agent.  See 2 U.S.C. § 1602(7)–(8) (1995) (defining 
lobbying activities and lobbying contact); see also The History of the Lobbying 
Disclosure Act, LOBBYINGINFO.ORG, July 26, 2005, http://www.lobbyinginfo.org 
/laws/page.cfm?pageid=15 (discussing the LDA’s clarification of definitions for 
“lobbyist” and “lobbying activities”).   
76 See 2 U.S.C. §1602(7)–(8) (1995) (defining “lobbyist activities” and 
“lobbying contact”). 
77 See id. § 1604(b) (describing the contents of an LDA report). 
78 22 U.S.C. § 612(a) (2006). 
79 2 U.S.C. § 1606 (1995). 
80 Registration for lobbyists lobbying for foreign commercial entities was 
removed from the purview of FARA and into that of the less stringent LDA.  See 
Craig Holman, Origins, Evolution and Structure of the Lobbying Disclosure Act, PUB. 
CITIZEN, May 11, 2006, at 11, available at http://www.cleanupwashington.org 
/documents/LDAorigins.pdf (elaborating on the substantive changes to FARA by 
the LDA). 
81 As we will see through the Dubai Ports deal, many of the assumptions of 
the LDA’s framers turned out to be wrong, and many “commercial” entities 
wishing to substantively affect U.S. policy have used the LDA exemption from 
FARA as a way around the full disclosure required by FARA, especially when the 
policy advocated is unpopular.  See infra Section 4.2.2.2. 
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There are several reasons FARA’s regulations are more 
strenuous than the LDA’s.  First, harkening back to FARA’s anti-
propaganda roots, congressional policy has tended to monitor 
those who are doing the bidding of another government.  
Moreover, due to its international scale, there is a greater perceived 
harm of foreign entities lobbying Congress to do their bidding as 
opposed to domestic lobbyists’ more personal and more domestic 
ambitions.82  Second, unlike domestic lobbyists, whose interests are 
vaguely perceived to be connected to the country as a whole, there 
exists an inherent fear of the secret perversion of our officials by 
foreign governments whose interests are not in line with those of 
the American people.83  Using Olson’s analysis, all actors act 
rationally for their own self-interest; foreign agents’ self-interest is 
with their government, while the interests of domestic agents are 
likewise domestic.84  Foreign agents represent foreign principals 
whose interest lie in their own self-preservation; hence, their desire 
is to affect American policy for their own betterment, regardless of 
its effect on the American people.85  On the other hand, domestic 
lobbyists are seen as also being concerned with America’s 
preservation along with their own.  This, therefore, requires less 
stringent disclosure of their activities.86 
 
82 See Baker, supra note 22, at 32 (“Lobbying for foreign interests potentially 
threatens the ability of the United States to detect and respond to breached trade 
agreements, trade barriers, and trade deficits between nations.”). 
83 William v. Luneburg, The Evolution of Federal Lobbying Regulation: Where We 
Are Now and Where We Should Be Going, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 85, 126 (2009) 
(“Given the exception from required FARA registration for lobbying by foreign 
commercial entities, the focus of that regime today is largely on lobbying by 
foreign governments and foreign political parties. That implicates national 
security and foreign policy interests that justify DOJ’s continued retention of 
FARA administration.”); see also Baker, supra note 22, at 33 (discussing the idea 
that any activity that threatens the economic health of the nation also threatens its 
national security). 
84 See OLSON, supra note 6, at 1–2 (arguing that while individuals are 
motivated to act in their own self-interest, they do not incorporate the outcome of 
group-based activities into the analysis of where this interest lies).  
85 Baker, supra note 22, at 32 (“Increased foreign investment in United States 
property leads foreign owners to protect their interests by increasing their 
involvement in domestic policies.”). 
86 Id. at 36 (“United States citizens are being denied the ability to make 
informed decisions on trade legislation issues because the ultimate source of 
information is often hidden. Agents of foreign principals can and do represent 
themselves as disinterested spokespersons from domestic constituencies because 
of the…exemptions of FARA.”). 
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4. FARA’S SHORTCOMINGS AND THEIR POTENTIAL EFFECT ON 
POLICY 
4.1. Loopholes and Failures of FARA 
Since its last substantive reform in 1966, many, including 
Congress itself, have pointed out FARA’s failures and 
shortcomings in lobbyist registration.87  Despite the outcry from 
several members of Congress, action has yet to be taken to revise 
foreign lobbyist registration.88 
4.1.1. DOJ Failures 
Perhaps the Act’s greatest setback is the lack of spirited 
enforcement from the Justice Department.  As noted, the Justice 
Department is charged with ensuring timely, adequate, and correct 
disclosure, and prosecuting non-disclosures.89  However, as the 
1963 Senate investigation shows, lack of enforcement dates almost 
from the point the DOJ first took control of FARA registration in 
1942.90  Furthermore, as GAO has pointed out, little action has been 
taken since.91  To put it simply—the DOJ’s enforcement of FARA 
has been abysmal—”[a]ccording to [the Department of] Justice, it 
 
87 See GAO 1974, supra note 34, at 1 (stating that the 1966 amendments to 
FARA did not have their intended effect); GAO 1980, supra note 40, at 1 (citing 
lack of DOJ enforcement as the largest barrier to effective disclosure); GAO 2008, 
supra note 40, at 15 (discussing changes that need to be made to increase FARA’s 
efficacy); HOWE & TROTT, supra note 27, at 13 (noting the size and growth of the 
foreign lobbying industry, especially ethnic lobbies); SMITH, supra note 21, at 186 
(describing the effects of the DOJ’s minimalist approach to FARA enforcement); 
CHOATE, supra note 42, at 202 (noting that FARA has many loopholes). 
88 See Hearing on S.R. 2279 Before the S. Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt, 
Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 102d Cong. 1–3 (1992) [hereinafter LDA Hearing] 
(statement of Sen. Levin) (noting that FARA has heretofore failed in disclosing 
foreign agents); HOWE & TROTT, supra note 27, at 26 (“A New York Democratic 
Congressman, Lester Wolff, . . . is investigating the policy making influence of 
multinational corporation lobbies and other pressure groups.”); SMITH, supra note 
30, at 41 (quoting Senator Fulbright) (stating that FARA disclosures are not 
adequately prosecuted); Perry, supra note 43, at 150–52 (discussing Senator 
Heinz’s proposed amendments to fix FARA’s enforcement failures). 
89 See supra text accompanying notes 58–63 (discussing the disclosure process 
and requirements). 
90 See Fulbright Hearings, supra note 31, at 1705–09 (discussing the failure of 
the justice department to prosecute the American Zionist Council’s admittedly 
misleading filings from 1950–1960). 
91 See GAO 2008, supra note 40, at 2 (“Our past work has found problems 
with the U.S. government’s implementation of these laws.”). 
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has prosecuted one violation of FARA since 1990.”92  There are 
several causes for this problem.  The first is that the Foreign Agent 
Registration Unit at the DOJ plainly does not have the resources to 
undergo any investigations of fraudulent filings, let alone non-
compliance altogether.93  Similarly, the unit only has eight staff 
members (six professional and two administrative), which is 
clearly not enough to even register and file the thousands of 
applications that they currently have.94 
Another cause for lax enforcement is the lack of a clear legal 
mandate for the DOJ.95  As previously noted, FARA is intended to 
be self-policing.  Therefore, agents do not have to notify the DOJ 
when they are claiming an exemption.  This effectively makes it 
harder for the DOJ to find violators because the unit is charged 
with not only prosecuting the violators, but also with actively 
monitoring all lobbying activities.96  This, when coupled with the 
small staff due to lack of funding, creates a disastrous lack of legal 
enforcement.97 
Finally, early political embarrassments from failed FARA 
enforcements have effectively stopped prosecutions since the 
1980s.  “Between 1944 and the 1963 [Senate] hearings, there were 
ten indictments and five convictions,”98 however, by 1974 “FARA’s 
full potential criminal sanctions were accurately portrayed as 
‘rarely pursued.’”99  Much of the stigma against prosecutions came 
from a rash of failures by the DOJ to effectively prosecute FARA 
 
92 Id. at 8. 
93 See id. at 14 (“[The DOJ] cited resource limitations as a barrier to 
monitoring compliance”); see also CRS 1977, supra note 38, at 28 (“lack of adequate 
staff and funds in the past have been cited as reasons for hampering fully effective 
enforcement of the Act.”). 
94 Id.; see also Kevin Bogardus, Foreign Lobbyist Database Could Vanish, CENTER 
FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, July 28, 2004, http://www.publicintegrity.org/articles 
/entry/486/ (quoting DOJ officials as stating that due to lack of funding, FARA’s 
online database is “so fragile” that it “could result in a major loss of data”). 
95 GAO 2008, supra note 40, at 14 (referring to justice officials that note the 
lack of clear legal authority pose a barrier to increased compliance monitoring). 
96 Id.; see also Perry, supra note 43, at 142–43 (noting that the DOJ faces a 
difficult task in monitoring potential violators). 
97 See CRS 1977, supra note 38, at 105 (concluding that the DOJ’s inability to 
effectively monitor provides “no assurance that foreign agents are properly 
identifying themselves and disclosing the identities of their foreign principal”). 
98 HOWE & TROTT, supra note 27, at 17.  In one of the most famous cases, Alex 
L. Guterma was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison for accepting $750,000 
“to disseminate . . . favorable propaganda” for the Dominican Republic.  Id. at 17. 
99 Id. at 186. 
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violations.100  Due to a string of case dismissals, the DOJ effectively 
saw criminal enforcement of FARA as a waste of the unit’s limited 
resources.101  As with all criminal prosecutions, violators are only 
deterred if there is an adequate threat of prosecution.102  
“Enforcement malaise causes entities in many sectors, from 
business to nonprofits to individuals, to question whether they are 
suckers for paying their fair share, playing by the rules, or 
disclosing relevant information that being a citizen of the United 
States demands.”103 
4.1.2. Foreign Business Entities 
As discussed above, FARA exempts registration of foreign 
commercial entities with contacts in the United States that are able 
to register under the LDA.104  While this was not the case prior to 
the LDA, its amendment of FARA placed foreign corporations out 
of FARA’s jurisdiction.105  The breadth of this exception cannot be 
understated.  Due to the LDA’s revision, even foreign state-owned 
companies are exempt from FARA, despite the fact that they 
clearly represent the bidding of the state itself, a principal that was 
intended to remain under the purview of FARA.106  Furthermore, 
even without the LDA’s revision, domestic subsidiaries of foreign 
corporations never fell under the purview of FARA because they 
are not “organized under the laws of another country,” even if the 
 
100 See United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(dismissing a case against pro-South African apartheid lobbyists because the 
statute of frauds ran out); United States v. Covington and Burling, 411 F. Supp. 
371, 377 (D.D.C. 1976) (dismissing a FARA case against the law firm Covington 
and Burling for lobbying on behalf of the Guinean government for attorney client 
privilege); SMITH, supra note 21, at 185–86 (discussing the dismissal of a 1976 case 
against Billy Carter, President Carter’s brother, who lobbied on behalf of Libya). 
101 See SMITH, supra note 21, at 202–03 (discussing the steady decline of FARA 
enforcement from the failures of the 1970s to the present). 
102 This is clearly shown in the case of the American Israeli Public Affairs 
Committee (“AIPAC”), whom the DOJ has failed in registering since AIPAC’s 
precursor in the 1950s.  Id. at 204. 
103 Id. at 203. 
104 See 22 U.S.C. § 613(h) (2006) (defining agents who are exempt from FARA, 
but are still required to register under the LDA). 
105 See Lawson, supra note 44, at 1178 (discussing and approving of the 
reasons given by the LDA’s framers for exempting commercial entities). 
106 See 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(B)(iv) (requiring that lobbying “on behalf of a 
government of a foreign country or a foreign political party” be disclosed under 
FARA).  
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policies they advocate are essentially those of its foreign parent.107  
The reasons for removal given by the drafters include:  the idea 
that corporate entities are more likely to comply if the 
requirements are easier, the notion that corporate entities do not 
seek to affect policy as much as political entities, and the 
assumption that domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations have 
mainly domestic interests.108  To some, this exemption may seem 
harmless, because, as the lobbyists argue, “overseas companies are 
not seeking to subvert American government policy.”109  However, 
as one commentator notes, “[i]ndeed, in this era of global 
competition, it is not realistic to expect foreign companies doing 
business with the United States to avoid attempting to influence 
U.S. policy in their favor.”110  Furthermore, because of the 
decreased scrutiny of the LDA, far less information is given about 
the lobbying activities by foreign entities.111 
4.1.3. Political Action Committee 
Political Action Committees (“PACs”), present a major problem 
that has only recently came into being.  While PACs did exist at the 
time of FARA’s revision in 1966, they did not play a major role in 
lobbying until campaign finance reform laws were interpreted to 
allow PACs to contribute far more money than any one individual 
could under such laws.112  While campaign contributions by PACs 
are not the subject FARA, PACs often act as “agents” by lobbying 
for a foreign entity’s political cause, thereby triggering FARA’s 
registration requirement as an agent of a foreign principal.  Certain 
PAC’s argue that because they are created by Americans they 
should be exempt from FARA for the same reason as domestic 
companies, because they are not “organized under the laws of 
 
107 22 U.S.C. § 611(b)(2) (2006). 
108 See Lawson, supra note 44, at 1178 (stating reasons for removal of 
corporate entities from the LDA by the framers). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 See Holman, supra note 80, at 11 (“Lobbyists registering under FARA . . . 
[lists] detailed business and financial information and must label all lobbying 
materials as representing the interests of the foreign government or party.  The 
financial disclosure requirements are considerably more extensive under FARA 
than under LDA.”). 
112 See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 
470 U.S. 480, 501 (1985) (holding that the campaign finance law unconstitutionally 
limited PACs due to its breadth). 
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another country.”113  However, unlike domestic subsidiaries where 
it is arguable that they “are not seeking to subvert policy,”114 PACs 
representing purely foreign interests, such as foreign governments, 
are in fact seeking to affect foreign policy for the foreign 
principal.115  It should not matter the form that one takes to 
influence policy, but the substance of the attempted influence. 
Notwithstanding potentially representing a purely foreign 
interest, PACs may pose an enforcement problem that corporations 
do not.   In order to fall under FARA, the organization must be the 
agent of a foreign principal; likewise, for a foreign corporation, it is 
not difficult to determine the jurisdiction of incorporation of the 
company that hired the lobbyist.  However, for PACs that 
represent a foreign government’s interests, the task is much more 
difficult because PACs are essentially domestic creations.  PACs, as 
domestically created organizations, act as a buffer between the 
lobbyist and the true foreign agent.  In order to determine 
accurately the foreign principal, one would have to analyze how 
the PAC is funded, who benefits from policies the PAC advocates, 
and the PAC’s leadership structure.  Theoretically, this task is not 
different from how actual FARA non-compliance enforcement 
should work.  As with domestic lobbying firms representing 
foreign interests, the DOJ would still have to determine who the 
principal is.  Moreover, “‘agency’ does not always require top-
down payment flows from the principal to the foreign agent; only 
demonstrable policy direction and coordination are necessary to 
prove [agency].”116  If an agent has not registered, under FARA, it 
is the duty of the DOJ to determine if any violation occurred.117  
 
113 22 U.S.C. § 613(b)(1) (2006). 
114 See Lawson, supra note 44, at 1178 (discussing and approving of the 
reasons given by the LDA’s framers for exempting commercial entities). 
115 For example, when Senator Fulbright investigated the American Zionist 
Council PAC in 1963, the Council admitted that the contributions they made to 
the AZC were to assist the “Zionist groups…to help them provide the services to 
the campaign, to assist fundraising for Israel through their publications.”  
Fulbright Hearings, supra note 31, at 1704–08 (testimony by Isador Hamlin of the 
American Zionist Council). 
116 SMITH, supra note 30, at 137. 
117 However, such a determination is not impossible.  For the most part, it is 
often quite clear when a PAC is working as an agent for a foreign government. 
For example, the DOJ in the past has traced funding back to foreign entities, or 
often the PACs themselves will admit to working for the purpose of a foreign 
nation.  See Sari Horwitz & Dan Eggen, FBI Searches Saudi Arabia’s PR Firm, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 9, 2004, at A08 (describing an FBI raid of a lobbying firm for alleged 
FARA violations). 
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Unfortunately, this problem is exacerbated by the DOJ’s inability to 
investigate potential violations.118 
4.1.4. Meetings Not Occurring on U.S. Soil 
FARA currently does not regulate any contact between 
lobbyists and politicians or their staff that does not take place in 
the United States.119  When the law was last amended in 1966, this 
was not a problem, as world travel was still in its infancy and 
lobbying had not reached the global scale it has today.120  As the 
law currently stands, the meetings abroad are completely 
undisclosed leaving it very tough for the public to “link the dots” 
on influence.121  As Senator Carl Levin once mentioned, “[t]he 
purpose of our lobbying laws is to tell the public who is being paid 
how much to lobby whom on what.  That purpose is not being 
served under the status quo as we now see it.”122  Therefore, in 
order to effectuate FARA’s purpose of adequate disclosure, we 
must ensure that each of the aforementioned loopholes is closed. 
4.2. Potential Policy Effects and Examples of FARA’s Failures 
While the failures of FARA noted above have shown why the 
Act should have been reformed after past scandals, the evidence 
from current scandals demonstrates not only a need but also an 
opportunity for reform.  Lobbying regulation does not seek to limit 
what lobbyists are allowed to say123—it recognizes that the “full 
 
118 This does not relieve the DOJ of its duty.  As the agency of the executive 
branch charged with enforcement power, it is their duty to ensure that the law is 
faithfully executed to its fullest extent. 
119 See Barry Meier, Lawmakers Seek to Close Foreign Lobbyist Loopholes, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 12, 2008, at A23 (“[The proposed FARA amendment] would require 
those who meet with American officials outside the country on behalf of foreign 
politicians to register as lobbyists, a step that existing law does not require.”). 
120 See Baker, supra note 22, at 33 (noting that the world has become 
increasingly globalized since FARA was last substantively updated, resulting in 
“massive growth in lobbying by foreign nations . . . .). 
121 See Posting of Andrew Zajac to Swamp Politics, Black Hole of Lobbying 
Disclosure, http://www.swamppolitics.com/news/politics/blog/2008/09/black 
_hole_of_lobbying_disclos.html (Sept. 23, 2008, 7:00 EST) (discussing the difficulty 
in transparency with regards to lobbying that occurs outside of the country).  
122 LDA Hearing, supra note 88, at 60 (statement of Sen. Levin).  
123 As noted by the Supreme Court, the First Amendment’s right to petition 
the government guarantees a right to lobby Congress.  See Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625 
(1954) (holding that Congress merely sought to “provide[] for a modicum of 
information from those who for hire attempt to influence legislation” and 
therefore did not violate freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment.). 
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realization of the American ideal of government by elected 
representatives depends to no small extent on [members of 
Congress’] ability to properly evaluate” the political pressures to 
which they are regularly subjected.124  Without this public 
information, “the voice of the people may all too easily be 
drowned out by the voice of special interest groups seeking 
favored treatment while masquerading as proponents of the public 
weal.”125 
However, in this regard, none of the events described below 
are per se wrong, that is to say, the policies advocated by these 
agents on behalf of their foreign principals may or may not be in 
the best interests of the U.S. government or the American public.  
However, when such access flies under the radar, neither the 
American public nor members of Congress are able to discern who 
is attempting to influence policy.  This undermines the spirit of 
FARA, causes the American ideal of government to fail, and 
threatens to “drown[] out” the opinion of the American public.126 
4.2.1. Foreign Policy 
4.2.1.1. Policy Effects 
There exists great potential for lobbyists to influence U.S. 
foreign policy.  For the most part foreign policy is an area in which 
most members of Congress are admittedly not experts, especially 
when it concerns the more remote areas of the world.127  As 
President Kennedy noted, even though lobbyists are “concededly . 
. . biased,” they are “in many cases expert technicians and capable 
of explaining complex and difficult subjects in a clear, 
understandable fashion.”128  Although knowledgeable, their 
concededly biased nature, when combined with the lack of 
 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 See HOWE & TROTT, supra note 27, at 16 (quoting Barber Conable, 
Republican Congressman of New York: “The system couldn’t work half as well 
without the hundreds of professional representatives of the various interest 
groups who make it their business to be sure a congressman knows the 
implications and effects of the sometimes complicated technical legislation.”).  
128 John F. Kennedy, To Keep the Lobbyist Within Bounds, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 
19, 1956, at SM6, reprinted in 102 CONG. REC. 3802 (1956) (statement of Sen. 
Neuberger). 
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knowledge a Member of Congress may have, can create several 
problems.  First, as noted by former Attorney General William B. 
Saxbe, foreign lobbyists are often very subtle; as he puts it, “you 
don’t always know you’re being lobbied.”129  This is only 
exacerbated by the fact that many foreign agents are often former 
members of Congress.130  “The familiarity that former officials have 
with ex-colleagues in the federal service is their greatest asset,” as 
they are able to have much more sway over their ex-colleagues, 
ultimately convincing them that their cause is correct.131  Without 
proper disclosure, members of Congress who are unaware that 
they are being lobbied may accept the information given as truth.  
Second, and related to the purpose of lobbying laws counteracting 
the collective action problem, without disclosure, the public is 
unaware that the issue has even been raised and is therefore less 
likely to counter-lobby.132  “The danger is that high-powered 
lobbyists representing the concerns of foreign parties may crowd 
out the legitimate concerns of Americans in the governmental 
decision-making process.“133  Third, even after the issue has been 
passed, a lack of registration prevents the public from determining 
what issues are being lobbied by whom.  The public will be unable 
to appreciate fully the relative change in policy if it cannot 
ascertain whether the change was sui generis or the product of 
undue foreign influence.  Finally, even while some argue that 
Congress will always ultimately act in the best interest of the 
voter,134 Congress cannot make a fully informed decision by only 
 
129 HOWE & TROTT, supra note 27, at 20–21 (quoting Attorney General William 
B. Saxbe). 
130 See GAO 2008, supra note 40, at 11–12 (identifying “29 former senior 
federal officials who left U.S. government service between 2000 and 2007 and 
registered as foreign agents with Justice.”); see also Spak, supra note 35, at 274 
(discussing former federal officials becoming lobbyists for foreign principals); 
Amanda B. Carpenter, Q & A with Congress: It’s OK to Lobby for Foreign 
Governments, HUM. EVENTS, Mar. 3, 2006, http://www.humanevents.com 
/article.php?id=12924&keywords=It%E2%80%99s+Okay+to+Lobby+for+Foreign
+Governments  (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (“[F]ormer Sen. Bob Dole had been hired 
as a lobbyist for the United Arab Emirates.”). 
131 Spak, supra note 35, at 274. 
132 See GAO 2008, supra note 40, at 7–8 (“[A] statement is ‘detailed’ within the 
meaning of the Act when it has the degree of specificity necessary to permit 
meaningful public evaluation of each of the significant steps taken by the 
registrant to achieve the purposes of the foreign principal-agent relationship.”). 
133 Spak, supra note 35, at 238.  
134 See generally HOWE & TROTT, supra note 27 (noting that some believe that 
members of Congress are able to adequately filter out information from lobbyists). 
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hearing one side of the issue.  Many members of Congress will 
often sincerely believe that their actions are helping those in a far-
off region while having little effect at home.  By hearing only one 
side of the story, the member effectively makes a decision with 
only half the pertinent information.  In each of these situations, 
adequate disclosure can prevent such issues. 
4.2.1.2. Recent Examples 
4.2.1.2.1. AIPAC 
Two recent foreign policy examples portray the need for 
disclosure of foreign lobbyists.  In each situation, after learning 
about the full extent of the lobbying, members of Congress 
expressed deep reservations for the policies they had just 
approved.  The American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(“AIPAC”) is the first example.  As shown through the Fulbright 
hearings of 1963, the pre-cursor to AIPAC, the American Zionist 
Council (“AZC”),135 was forced by the DOJ to register under 
FARA.136  Learning from the experience of the AZC, AIPAC has 
been able to evade registration since its inception despite multiple 
attempts by the DOJ to enforce registration.137  Furthermore, as it 
was with the AZC, it is beyond argument that AIPAC is an agent 
 
135 The AZC and AIPAC were both created by Isaiah Kenen; however, 
AIPAC was created to be more domestically rooted.  See DAVID HOWARD 
GOLDBERG, FOREIGN POLICY AND ETHNIC INTEREST GROUPS: AMERICAN AND 
CANADIAN JEWS LOBBY FOR ISRAEL 19 (1990) (explaining how the lessons that Kenen 
learned from the AZC eventually led him to create AIPAC, which was 
“acknowledged as the effective political arm of the organized AZC.”); see also 
HOWE & TROTT, supra note 27, at 6 (noting that Kenen saw AIPAC as more 
domestically rooted than the AZC).  Before shifting from the AZC to AIPAC, 
Kenen was forced by the DOJ to register the AZC under FARA.  See ISRAEL OFFICE 
OF INFORMATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SUPPLEMENTAL REGISTRATION STATEMENT 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 2 OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938 (filed 
Oct. 30, 1950), available at http://www.irmep.org/ila/Kenen/IOI/1950IOI_FARA 
/default.asp (showing Kenen’s supplemental registration statement under 
FARA).  
136 See generally Fulbright Hearings, supra note 31, at 1307–12.  
137 See STEPHEN SCHWARTZ, IS IT GOOD FOR THE JEWS?: THE CRISIS OF AMERICA’S 
ISRAEL LOBBY 242 (2006) (describing AIPAC’s ability to evade registration under 
FARA and quoting one official as saying that registration would be AIPAC’s 
“death knell”); see also GOLDBERG, supra note 135, at 17 (noting that those within 
the organization have “consistently emphasized: AIPAC is not a foreign agent”); 
SMITH, supra note 30, at 98 (describing the creation of AIPAC as a “successful 
exercise that bent the letter and spirit of at least two other laws—the Foreign 
Registration Act and the Logan Act.”). 
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of Israel.138  While it has registered under the LDA, thereby taking 
advantage of the lax requirements and not disclosing copies of 
agreements, the lack of enforcement by the DOJ is viewed as the 
main reason why AIPAC is not registered under FARA.139  This 
lack of monitoring eventually led to the indictment of two high-
ranking AIPAC officials for espionage for Israel.140  Stephen Rosen, 
AIPAC’s director of foreign policy issues, and Keith Weissman, 
AIPAC’s senior Middle East analyst, worked with Colonel 
Lawrence Franklin, who held top-secret military intelligence 
clearance, to send sensitive information about terror threats in the 
Middle East to Israel.141  While the trial for Weissman and Rosen is 
still pending, Franklin, who pleaded guilty of conspiracy to 
commit espionage after cooperation with the FBI against Weissman 
and Rosen, was sentenced to twelve and a half years for passing 
classified information to AIPAC and an Israeli diplomat.142  This is 
exactly the type of incident FARA was designed to prevent:  the 
contact and lobbying of U.S. officials by those representing foreign 
principals, in this case the State of Israel.  Had FARA been enforced 
in the context of AIPAC, its regulations would have required that 
all communications between Colonel Franklin and AIPAC be filed 
with the DOJ.  Moreover, even if AIPAC chose not to file for the 
meetings where the intelligence documents were passed, had they 
been registered under FARA, other meetings, documents, and 
funds transfers may have been filed that could have created a 
 
138 For example, AIPAC was able to lobby successfully for the passage of the 
Saudi Arabia Accountability Act, which threatened to cut off military aid to Saudi 
Arabia, because it was against Israel’s interest to have an armed neighbor.  See 
SCHWARTZ, Supra note 137, at 241 (discussing details of the Saudi Arabia 
Accountability Act and the harsh sanctions provided in cases of non-compliance).  
See also SMITH, supra note 30, at 137 (noting several instances of direct lobbying 
orders from the Israeli government to congress on their behalf); Walter Pincus, 
Intelligence Pick Blames “Israel Lobby” for Withdrawal, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2009, at 
A1 (reporting that Charles Freeman withdrew from appointment for an 
intelligence post as a result of intense pro-Israel lobbying). 
139 See SMITH, supra note 21, at 202 (describing lack of DOJ enforcement as the 
main reason for non-registry). 
140 See United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 602 (E.D. Va. 2006) 
(denying defendants’ motion to dismiss charges). 
141 See id. at 608 (describing how the officials obtained sensitive information). 
142 Mark Mathews, This is the FBI—Can We Talk?, WASHINGTONIAN, Jan. 01, 
2008, at 76, available at http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people 
/6215.html.  
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paper trail.143  As written, FARA has very strenuous disclosure 
requirements, and many of these requirements could have led to 
an investigation into the matter.  Similarly, it may have even 
provided deterrence against the incident, because of the potential 
for DOJ investigation and criminal penalties. 
4.2.1.2.2. USINPAC 
The DOJ’s enforcement failure against AIPAC, as described 
above,144 has not gone unnoticed by other foreign lobbying groups.  
“Following consciously in AIPAC’s footsteps, the India lobby is 
getting results in Washington—and having a profound impact on 
U.S. policy, with important consequences for the future of Asia and 
the world.”145  The main lobby of India in the United States is the 
United States India Political Action Committee (“USINPAC”).  
USINPAC has had major recent success in Congress by 
successfully lobbying the passage of a U.S.–Indian nuclear fuel 
deal, whereby the United States will now sell nuclear fuel to India 
(despite such a sale being against the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty (“NPT”)).146  Whether or not this deal is in the United States’ 
best interest is not for this comment to argue, however what is 
clear is that even with round-the-clock lobbying, much like AIPAC, 
USINPAC did not register its lobbying activities under FARA.147  
Similar to AIPAC, USINPAC should have registered under FARA, 
as an agent of a foreign government.  The Indian government has 
admitted using USINPAC as a tool, even stating that the lobbying 
“constitutes an invaluable asset in strengthening India’s 
 
143 See Fulbright Hearings, supra note 31, at 1326–28 (discussing payments 
made by the Jewish Agency to the AZC); SMITH, supra note 21, at 203 (“[I]t is 
obvious that when FARA faced its biggest challenge, it completely failed the 
American people.”). 
144 See supra text accompanying notes 89–103 (giving reasons for lack of 
enforcement). 
145 Mira Kamdar, Forget the Israel Lobby.  The Hill’s Next Big Player is Made in 
India, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2007, at B3.  See also JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER & STEPHEN 
M. WALT, THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POL’Y 359 n.20 (2007) (noting the 
ascendance of the Indian lobby as another example of a major ethnic lobby). 
146 See Kamdar, supra note 145, at B03 (noting the round-the-clock efforts by 
the lobby to ensure passage of a U.S.–Indian nuclear fuel deal and the resulting 
waiver of the MPT for India). 
147 See Jason A. Kirk, Indian-Americans and the U.S.–India Nuclear Agreement: 
Consolidation of an Ethnic Lobby?, 4 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS 275, 278 (2008) 
(noting that the USINPAC did not have to register under FARA, and arguing 
against registration). 
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relationship with the world’s only superpower.”148  This creates the 
exact foreign principal and agent relationship that requires 
disclosure and filing under the Act.  In terms of actual ability to 
influence, many commentators have noted that the Indian lobby 
was “critical in pressing members of Congress to support the 
agreement.”149  In 2006 when the bill was first introduced, 
congressional support was so low that some considered the deal to 
be “dead in the water.”150  However, the lobby then began their 
efforts in 2006, pushing its view to members of Congress.  They 
“frame[d] the issue in a way that emphasized its positive linkages 
to other goals in U.S. policy toward India,” in particular, 
outsourcing, the war on terror, and global warming.151  Eventually, 
despite significant opposition early on, the bill passed Congress by 
a significant margin.152 
This process illustrates FARA’s failure in the foreign policy 
realm.  As stated above, without FARA registration, the public and 
specifically the non-proliferation counter-lobby were unaware of 
the significant efforts being made by the Indian lobby to insure 
passage.  Much of the success of the bill resided in one-sided 
lobbying.  While the Indian lobbyists may have provided expert 
information regarding their point of view, little was provided 
against the bill.153  Additionally, while we know that the Indian 
lobby was involved with lobbying Congress for this bill, the extent 
and amount remains a mystery because the LDA does not require 
itemized spending lists or lists of meetings.  Finally, because the 
United States is beginning to sign similar deals with other 
 
148 MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 145, at 13 n.20 (quoting an Indian 
Government Committee). 
149 Kirk, supra note 147, at 276; see also Kamdar, supra note 145, at B03 (“The 
nuclear pact brought together an Indian government that is savvier than ever 
about playing the Washington game, an Indian American community that is just 
coming into its own and powerful business interests that see India as perhaps the 
single biggest money-making opportunity of the 21st century.”). 
150 Kirk, supra note 147, at 294 (describing initial reaction to the bill). 
151 Id. at 295. 
152 See Peter Baker, Civilian Nuclear Trade Deal for India Is Backed by Senate, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at A8 (reporting that “[t]he Senate ratified the deal 86 to 
13 a week after the House passed it”). 
153 See Kirk, supra note 147, at 285 (“[I]t came as much as a surprise to many 
members of Congress as it did to incredulous nonproliferation specialists in 
Washington.”). 
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countries, such as the United Arab Emirates,154 it is important that 
this information be disclosed, in order to fully understand the 
amount of lobbying for each deal.  Again, whether or not such a 
deal is in the best interests of the American people is debatable; 
however, it does matter that the American people remain informed 
for the “full realization of the American ideal of government.”155 
4.2.2. Domestic Trade Policy 
4.2.2.1. Japan 
The ability of foreign lobbyists to affect U.S. economic policy is 
an area that most are familiar with.  Similar to foreign policy, 
without adequate disclosure, many members of Congress may 
believe that they are enacting changes for the benefit of American 
businesses, not recognizing the actual foreign elements pushing for 
the changes.156  However, it was the perceived entrenchment of 
Japanese economic lobby that triggered the reform that created the 
LDA.157  In the late 1980s, the Japanese were very successful at 
lobbying for one-sided tariff reductions on electronics imports by 
arguing that they provided thousands of jobs to Americans.158  This 
spurned calls for increased registration through the LDA.  
However, it has become clear today that many foreign companies 
are able to hide behind their subsidiary or register under the more-
permissive LDA to escape FARA’s scrutiny, while still having an 
adverse effect on policy.159  The switch to the LDA has been such a 
failure that Congress has recently proposed to put foreign 
 
154 Robert Burns, US Inks Nuclear Cooperation Deal with Gulf Ally, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Jan. 15, 2009, available at http://www.istockanalyst.com/article 
/viewiStockNews/articleid/2958347 (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).  
155  United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954). 
156 See CHOATE, supra note 42, at 174 (noting, through the example of Harald 
Malmgrem, that without FARA disclosure, it is difficult to determine for whom 
someone is actively lobbying). 
157 See generally Baker, supra note 22, at 25 (discussing how Congress 
amended FARA to cover lobbying government officials and added commercial 
activities to registration requirements). 
158 See id. at 30–32 (discussing how Toshiba was able to successfully lobby for 
a decrease in penalties from the U.S. government by arguing that Toshiba 
provided thousands of jobs to Americans, despite having sold military grade 
electronics to the USSR). 
159 See generally CHOATE, supra note 42, at 110 (noting “only…party chiefs 
know how much of [foreign monies paid to political campaigns] came from the 
U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-owned corporations.”). 
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corporations back under FARA because “such fuller disclosures 
should take place so lawmakers and the public could better 
understand how lobbyists for foreign entities were trying to 
influence Congress.”160  As noted above, “in this era of global 
competition, it is not realistic to expect foreign companies doing 
business with the United States to avoid attempting to influence 
U.S. policy in their favor.”161  Similarly, foreign corporations’ 
interests lie in their own self-preservation; hence, their desire is to 
affect American policy for their own betterment regardless of its 
effect on the American people.162 
4.2.2.2. Dubai Ports World 
The Dubai ports deal is a recent example of the need for 
adequate disclosure through FARA, as opposed to the LDA.  The 
deal was structured so that DP World International (“DPW”), a 
United Arab Emirates state-owned company, would acquire 
several U.S. ports through its acquisition of the former owner.163  
Due to national security concerns, such a sale must undergo a 
forty-five day review by the President.  During this time, DPW 
hired several firms to lobby the President for the deal’s approval.  
However, because of the foreign business exemption under FARA, 
DPW was allowed to file under the LDA.  Unlike FARA, the LDA 
does not require a description of lobbying activities or agreements 
undertaken.  The LDA, unlike FARA, does not require a 
description of the underlying entity.  In this situation, the entity 
was able to register simply as “DPW” without further description.  
This created a situation where no member of Congress was put on 
alert when Alston & Bird was lobbying for approval of the deal.164  
Even if a diligent member would have researched DPW, the LDA 
allows one to file up to forty-five days after the actual lobbying 
 
160 Meier, supra note 119, at A23 (quoting Senator Claire McCaskill). 
161 Lawson, supra note 44, at 1178. 
162 See Baker, supra note 22, at 33 (“Increased foreign investment in United 
States property leads foreign owners to protect their interests by increasing their 
involvement in domestic policies.”). 
163 See Timeline of Controversial Ports Deal, CNN, Mar. 9, 2006, http://www 
.cnn.com/2006/US/02/23/ports.timeline/index.html (describing the structure of 
the deal). 
164 See Posting of Bill Allison to Sunlight Foundation Blog, Why We Need 
Faster Lobbying Disclosure, http://blog.sunlightfoundation.com/2006/12/20/why 
-we-need-faster-lobbying-disclosure/ (Dec. 20, 2006, 13:17 EST) (discussing how 
DPW was able to go under the radar). 
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took place while FARA requires one to file within ten days.165  
Theoretically, DPW could have filed after the forty-five day review 
was over.  This likely would have occurred were it not for a small 
port company in Florida, who notified Congress that DPW—a 
U.A.E. state-owned company—was seeking to purchase control of 
major U.S. ports.166 
The situation of DPW and state-owned companies highlights 
the need for a return to the requirement of disclosure of 
commercial entities under FARA.  In international trade, national 
security concerns are often raised:  “The fear was that the U.A.E.-
owned firm would be more susceptible to infiltration by terrorists, 
who would have access to U.S. port facilities and foreign (perhaps 
un-inspected) cargo.”167  The ability of a foreign company to affect 
U.S. national policy is unlike that of any domestic corporation.  In 
this case, the LDA prevented Congress and likewise the public 
from learning about the true nature of a deal before the President.  
FARA registration could have prevented this situation because it 
requires faster and more detailed disclosure.  Similarly, a member 
of the public searching the file would have known the exact details 
of the lobbying effort.  Foreign entities wishing to do business in 
America should be subject to increased disclosure, as Senator 
McCaskill noted, “[i]f they want to take foreign clients, . . . they 
must be willing to claim them.”168 
5. IMPROVING FARA 
FARA, in and of itself, is a very powerful tool in regulating 
lobbyists.  While it may have certain loopholes that need to be 
plugged, its substantive provisions are quite strong.  Thus, FARA 
reformations should first address the main problem of lack of DOJ 
enforcement.  Next, comprehensive FARA reform should include 
slight changes to the Act itself to clarify exactly who qualifies as an 
agent of a foreign principal and what disclosure is required of 
them.  Because such slight changes would make major differences, 
the chance for substantive changes to FARA is very feasible. 
 
165 Id. 
166 See High Court Clears P&O’s Takeover, BBC NEWS, Mar. 2, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4765262.stm (noting that a Florida 
shipping firm, Eller & Co., first brought DPW to the U.S. government’s attention 
because the purchase would have hurt it economically). 
167 Allison, supra note 164.  
168 Meier, supra note 119. 
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5.1. Increasing DOJ Enforcement 
While most will argue that increased funding for the Foreign 
Agent Registration Unit would make the most substantive 
difference,169 there are changes to the law itself that would also 
make the DOJ’s enforcement task easier and therefore decrease 
non-registration. 
First, requiring those who do not file under FARA to notify the 
DOJ that they are claiming an exemption will dramatically ease the 
DOJ’s burden.  Currently, because of the self-policing nature of 
FARA, the DOJ carries the affirmative burden to seek out those 
who are not registering due to a claimed exemption.170  “Without 
imposing an affirmative duty on agents to notify FARA’s 
administrators of reliance on an exemption, the short-staffed 
registration unit cannot possibly enforce FARA’s objectives.”171  As 
GAO has recommended several times, this would ease the burden 
on the Foreign Agent Registration Unit by shifting their role from 
affirmatively “monitoring” applications to simply screening 
them.172  This role is much better suited for a staff of only ten.173 
Second, to increase the likelihood of the DOJ pursuing 
enforcement, the possibility of civil damages should be added.  
Many consider the inclusion of the possibility of civil trials to be a 
major accomplishment of the LDA.174  As FARA currently stands, 
the only way for the DOJ to enforce FARA is to indict violators.  
This is a major disincentive for enforcement because the DOJ must 
convince a grand jury to indict, collect enough evidence to satisfy 
the higher burden of proof, face a jury who is often skeptical of 
sending someone to jail simply for not registering, and prove 
 
169 See GAO 2008, supra note 40, at 14 (“Justice cited resources limitations as a 
barrier to monitoring FARA compliance . . . .”).  Increased funding for 
prosecutions would have the greatest deterrence effect.  Currently, many do not 
obey the full letter of the law because the DOJ has not actively prosecuted 
violators since the 1970s.  If the DOJ were to increase enforcement through more 
funding, it would also likely create a deterrence effect.   
170 See Perry, supra note 43, at 142 (“Agents have no affirmative obligation to 
apply for an exemption.”). 
171 Id. at 147. 
172 See GAO 2008, supra note 40, at 15 (describing that the Unit monitors, 
among other things, news articles to identify potential registrants).  
173 See id. at 14 (explaining that FARA’s Registration Unit staff has declined 
from thirteen members in 1990 to eight in 2008).  
174 See Lawson, supra note 44, at 1182 (“While the LDA provides for civil fines 
of up to $50,000 for a violation of its registration requirements, these civil fines are 
not applicable to those who violate the registration imperatives of FARA.”). 
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FARA’s current mens rea of intent to fraudulently file.175  “So long 
as FARA administrators are reluctant to impose the severe criminal 
penalties available under FARA, the continuing absence of civil 
fines for such violations seems to send potential registrants the 
message that they can ignore FARA’s guidelines with impunity.”176  
In 1987, Senator Heinz proposed to amend FARA to allow for the 
imposition of civil fines and investigations.177  While Congress did 
not act on his proposal, it represents the best attempt at reform to 
date.  His proposal included adding civil subpoena power in 
addition to allowing for the imposition of civil fines.178  The 
addition of subpoena power will increase FARA compliance by 
giving the DOJ the “authority to inspect the records of persons 
Justice believes should be registered . . . .”179  This will also ease the 
DOJ’s burden by lowering the standard of proof required at trial.  
The result would be to increase enforcement of FARA, thereby 
increasing its deterrent effect.  Furthermore, as some commentators 
note, shifting the penalties from criminal to civil will remove the 
“stigma” seen with FARA registry.180 
Finally, by conferring standing upon private citizens to sue 
under FARA, cases can be brought to the DOJ’s attention.  As the 
law stands now, FARA does not explicitly or implicitly give 
standing for private citizens to sue.181  One way to offer standing, 
similar to the proposed reform for the Ethics in Government Act, is 
to “confer standing upon private citizens to challenge the Attorney 
General’s refusal to” enforce FARA.182  This would allow private 
citizens to bring cases of lax FARA enforcement to the attention of 
the DOJ.  However, this proposal is problematic because it could 
easily tie the DOJ up with many frivolous lawsuits; it would allow 
 
175 See Perry, supra note 43, at 152 (noting that civil fines would encourage 
compliance and provide a more proportional remedy than criminal sanctions).  
176 Lawson, supra note 44, at 1183. 
177 See generally Perry, supra note 43 (discussing all of the proposals to change 
FARA offered by Senator Heinz). 
178 See id. at 157 (discussing Senator Heinz’s proposal for civil penalties). 
179 GAO 2008, supra note 40, at 5. 
180 See, e.g., Schor, supra note 16 (quoting a PR specialist who noted that 
registering under FARA makes one feel like a criminal); Perry, supra note 43, at 
159–60 (“A simple modification of terms may increase compliance with the Act.”). 
181 See Comm. for a Free Namibia v. Sw. Africa People’s Org., 554 F. Supp. 
722, 726 (D.D.C. 1982) (dismissing a case by a private group for lack of standing). 
182 Spak, supra note 35, at 288. 
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“baseless allegations” of violations.183  Perhaps a better proposal 
would be to allow for private citizens to sue organizations directly 
for equitable relief of FARA non-compliance.  Standing could be 
conferred based on potential harm suffered by the change in policy 
or rule that could result from the lobbyist’s advocacy.  This would 
decrease the chances of frivolous suits because only equitable relief 
would be available.  Hence, only organizations with a significant 
enough stake in the outcome would sue.184  Furthermore, if a 
FARA case before a court catches the attention of the DOJ, the DOJ 
would then be able to intervene as an interested party in the 
matter.  This would increase the possibility of enforcement, thus 
creating deterrence and, ultimately increase registration. 
Except for creating a private right of action,185 most of the 
above changes are very feasible because they have been offered 
before.  The passage of the LDA, which includes civil remedies, is 
proof that Congress is willing to consider such a change.  
Moreover, due to the LDA’s blatant failure with DPW and the 
increased calls to reform FARA, there is a substantial likelihood of 
reform.186  Similarly, the scandals increase the likelihood that 
Congress will follow the GAO’s recommendation to reform 
FARA’s self-enforcement stance.187 
5.2. Other Potential Reforms 
While FARA itself has strong potential for significant 
disclosure, unclear language and certain loopholes hamper it 
substantially.188  First and perhaps most feasible, would be an 
effort to close FARA’s loopholes.  This could be done in part by 
approving a FARA reform bill introduced in Congress in 2008 that 
 
183 Id. 
184 While there will still be a chance of frivolous suits, adding heightened 
pleading requirements would likely take care of many of them. 
185 Congress and the Supreme Court are generally averse to creating new 
rights of action for citizens, because of the increased strain it could have on the 
courts.  Cf. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 
161 (2008) (declining to extend on implied cause of action, which would have 
allowed aider-abettor liability in a securities fraud class action).  
186 See Schor, supra note 16 (noting that Congress is beginning to hold 
hearings on reforming FARA, including the establishment of civil damages). 
187 See GAO 2008, supra note 40, at 14–15 (noting that GAO has called upon 
Congress several times to fix FARA’s self-enforcement mechanism). 
188 See id. at 12 (“Justice officials have cited a lack of clear legal authority and 
a lack of resources as barriers to monitoring compliance with FARA registration 
requirements.”). 
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would bring foreign corporations back under FARA, and would 
extend FARA’s reach to lobbying that occurs off U.S. soil.189  Such 
measures would prevent incidents like DPW or the AIPAC 
espionage trial from reoccurring and provide the public with the 
information that it deserves under the Act.  As mentioned above, 
foreign commercial interests can have a significant effect on U.S. 
policy; therefore, the increased disclosure requirements under 
FARA are necessary.  Enacting change in this regard is 
substantively very easy.  Congress can exempt those who file 
under the LDA by removing section 613(h) of the Act.  
Furthermore, officials should not be immune from scrutiny just 
because they are not on U.S. soil.  While these officials are 
representing American interests, the public has a right to know 
when foreign entities are trying to obtain influence wherever such 
attempts are located.  A new section should increase the scope of 
the Act to include the lobbying of officials that occurs on foreign 
soil. 
Congress should also strive to improve FARA compliance by 
clarifying its substantive provisions.  One of the most common 
complaints by lobbyists is that FARA does not clearly indicate who 
must register.190  While FARA was amended in 1942 to include 
registration of lobbyists, the substantive text of the Act is still 
rooted in propaganda.  A redefinition of the terms “agent” and 
“principal” should clarify exactly who should register under the 
Act.  As Senator Heinz proposed, “principal” should be redefined 
to include domestic companies that are sponsored by foreign 
entities.191  To do so, Senator Heinz proposed redefining “agent” to 
include someone predominantly under the control of a foreign entity.192  
Unfortunately, this change alone would not provide the clarity that 
is necessary to resolve whether actual agency exists.  Instead, the 
Act should define “predominant” control as including both 
monetary and physical control.193  This change would clearly put 
 
189 See Meier, supra note 119, at A23 (discussing the FARA reform bill 
introduced by Senators Claire McCaskill and Chuck Schumer).  
190 See Lawson, supra note 44, at 1178 (describing the confusion under FARA 
as one of the driving forces towards creating the LDA exception).  
191 See Perry, supra note 43, at 149 (discussing Senator Heinz’s proposal to 
redefine Agent and principal).   
192 Id. 
193 See id. at 158 (proposing a definition for “predominantly a foreign 
interest” to complement to Senator Heinz’s proposals).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
ATIEH.DOC 11/17/2010  2:57 PM 
1086 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:4 
PACs and domestic subsidiaries under FARA, thereby settling the 
question of its applicability. 
Congress could also use the definitions of lobbying under the 
LDA in FARA.  Many lauded the LDA for defining lobbying 
activities more clearly.  Using this model, Congress could more 
accurately define the types of activities and relationships that are 
included under the Act.  Similarly, Congress may consider 
changing the names of the terms “agent” and “principal” to reflect 
a move away from propaganda.  The word “agency” connotes that 
the lobbyist is controlled by the foreign entity in the traditional 
common law manner.194  When the focus turns to a foreign 
government’s control of the group the analysis becomes very 
difficult. 
On the one hand, the fact that a group hopes to represent 
foreign interests cannot possibly be cause for labeling that 
group as foreign.  People regularly, and promisingly, 
advocate positions on behalf of others that might otherwise 
be voiceless and unrepresented.  On the other hand, once 
foreign money enters the equation, it is translated into 
domestic advocacy, and the use of levers of democracy to 
pursue foreign ends.195   
Simply changing the Act to reflect the current realities of lobbying 
could potentially decrease confusion and likewise clarify 
registration requirements.196  “Removing the stigma attached to the 
Act, it is argued, would lead to higher rates of compliance.  People 
would not be as hesitant to register as an ‘international information 
aide’ as opposed to a ‘foreign agent.’”197 
Most recently, President Obama proposed reforming FARA 
and the LDA to close many of the abovementioned loopholes.  In 
his 2010 State of the Union speech, President Obama proposed 
updating the LDA to include FARA-like disclosure 
 
194 See Attorney Gen. v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 668 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(finding that agency as defined in FARA is broader than the common law 
definition). 
195 Zephyr Teachout, Extraterritorial Electioneering and the Globalization of 
American Elections, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 162, 188 (2009). 
196 See Lawson, supra note 44, at 1180 (proposing that a definition of terms 
would lead to greater clarity and thus greater compliance).  
197 Spak, supra note 35, at 278 (quoting Congressional Research Service, The 
Foreign Agents Registration Act, SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95 CONG., 1st 
Sess. (1977)). 
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requirements.198  Since the LDA created many of the loopholes 
found in FARA, this would fix the majority of the problems with 
lobbyist disclosure today.  Foreign entities would no longer be able 
to register under a more permissive disclosure regime; instead, 
they will be forced to disclose all contacts with politicians within 
twenty-four hours of the meeting.199 
As for the feasibility of passing these reforms, many were 
previously proposed and a majority were incorporated into the 
LDA.  Initially, it was believed that the LDA would sufficiently 
clarify the regulations.  However, given the LDA’s inadequacy 
these regulations should be enacted to clarify FARA.  Considering 
Congress has already passed these clarifications, passing them 
again is very feasible. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Lobbying is a function of the collective action dilemma.  The 
public is at an information disadvantage compared to the lobbyists 
who have the most direct ability to influence legislation.  However, 
once the public becomes aware and wary of a certain interest 
group’s influence, such as Taiwan in the 1970s, Japan in the 1980s, 
or the UAE today, public outrage drives lobbying reform.  In the 
realm of foreign lobbying, whether this will drive the reform of 
FARA remains to be seen.  However, it is relatively clear that 
FARA should be restructured so that it will effectively uphold its 
charged task.  FARA was charged with solving the collective action 
dilemma by providing the public information on potentially 
unfavorable, lobbyist-driven proposals before they reach the level 
of becoming a public scandal.  As shown by the above examples, a 
strongly enforced FARA would have prevented many of the 
publicly unfavorable, lobbyist-driven proposals that simply 
slipped through the cracks.  Foreign lobbying has typically been 
 
198 Barack Obama, President of the United States, State of the Union Address 
(Jan 27, 2010) (“It’s time to require lobbyists to disclose each contact they make on 
behalf of a client with my administration or with Congress.”); Bogardus, supra 
note 4 (“The Foreign Agent Registration Act already requires lobbyists and other 
representatives of foreign governments and political parties to disclose all their 
contacts with policymakers on behalf of their clients.  Public interest groups tried 
to include a similar requirement for the LDA in the 2007 ethics bill, but that effort 
failed.”).  
199 See Bogardus, supra note 4 (discussing changes proposed by the Obama 
administration regarding foreign lobbyists, with an emphasis on closing the LDA 
loopholes).  
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seen as more nefarious than its domestic counterpart; however, the 
law as currently enforced, portrays the message that foreign 
lobbying does not matter and registration is unnecessary. 
The purpose of lobbying law is to inform the public what 
relevant information members of Congress consider when making 
their decision to vote.  Only through adequate disclosure of these 
activities, can the public truly understand who has attempted to 
influence members of Congress and how.  FARA, if clarified and 
enforced, is a very powerful tool for the public.  Thankfully, fixing 
the FARA statute is not a difficult task.  FARA needs to further 
shift away from its roots in propaganda, close substantive 
loopholes regarding corporations and PACs, and take back 
jurisdiction for foreign trade lobbies from the LDA.  For the most 
part, many of the pieces have either already been proposed or 
enacted elsewhere.  The difficult part continues to be getting the 
DOJ to enforce it.  While attempts at reformation could be made by 
giving the DOJ tools through civil actions, it will all be meaningless 
if the DOJ itself is unwilling to move forward.  Unfortunately, it 
may take another scandal to activate the political branches. 
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